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I. INTRODUCTION
Trial by jury is an integral feature of the American judicial sys-
tem, I providing a legal structure in which citizens actively participate
in the process of adjudication.2 By community participation, the jury
makes "fair" the stringency of certain decisions 3 and provides a signif-
icant civic experience for the citizen.4 More importantly, however,
the jury is a key feature in the separation of powers5 doctrine because
1. The civil jury's function is to apply the facts (as presented in evidence during the trial)
of a particular case to the law (as the judge expresses the law in his instructions to the jury), in
order to reach a decision regarding the defendant's liability. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into
the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 833-36 (1980).
2. Popular participation in the administration of justice contributes to the
characteristically high regard Americans have for the law. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, Trial by
Jury in the United States as a Political Institution, in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291-97 (J.
Bradley ed. 1966) (1st ed. Paris 1835), cited in R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 6-7 (1980).
3. Zeisel, The American Jury, in THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM FINAL REPORT 65, 67
(1977).
4. Id. at 66.
5. The influence of the seventh amendment on the federal Constitution makes the jury an
essential factor in the structure of the process that the Constitution provides. Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Co-Op, 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In this state workman's compensation suit
brought in the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction, the district court denied the injured
worker a jury trial. The Supreme Court held that the strong federal interest in preserving the
jury system precluded application of a state rule denying jury trial. The Court explicitly
reached this result even though, under the Erie doctrine, federal courts must respect the
definition of rights created by the state courts in diversity actions. Id. at 535-36.
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it provides a popular check on the three branches of government.
The framers of the Constitution allocated power among the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial branches, diffusing this power through a
system of checks and balances. Although the framers, by granting life
tenure and protected salaries to judges,6 intended to make the judici-
ary the most independent of the three branches,7 there is a popularly
perceived danger that the legislative and executive branches may
unduly influence the judiciary.' For example, a sense of subservience
may coerce judges to rule in favor of the views of the president who
appointed them. Similarly, majoritarian outrage may compel judges
to decide cases in a way oppressive to discrete minorities.9 This is of
particular concern when the government brings suit to enforce a legis-
lative enactment. One of the primary reasons for establishing the jury
system in the constitutional scheme was to offset this possible oppres-
sion by the judiciary.'0 The jury in such an instance acts as the only
check (other than the extraordinary measure of impeachment) on a
potentially oppressive judiciary. The jury functions as a fourth
branch of government (traditionally the role assigned to the press"),
preventing potential abuses and diffusing the judge's possible reluc-
tance to take an unpopular position by reaching a verdict different
from that which the judge might be willing to reach. The jury
restores community values to the inherently arbitrary process of deci-
sion making. ' 2 The framers conceived the jury as fulfilling just such a
6. U.S. CONST. art. III.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394 (A. Hamilton) (G. Wills ed. 1982).
8. See generally Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 653-71 (1973).
9. Although given life tenure, federal judges are clearly open to political pressure from
the executive branch (troublesome because of the close relationship and potential for
psychological subservience) and from so-called "public opinion" (the tyranny of the majority,
which so concerned the framers in setting up the democratic system of government). The
antifederalists brought home this point during the ratification debates. See Wolfram, supra
note 8, at 695. During the journalistic battle between federalists and antifederalists, Judge
Bryan (an antifederalist) wrote that government appointed judges will have
a bias toward those of their own rank and dignity; for it is not to be expected,
that the few should be attentive to the rights of the many. This therefore
preserves in the hands of the people, that share which they ought to have in the
administration of justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful
and wealthy citizens.
Id. at 695-96 (quoting Bryan, Letters of Centinell II, Freemans J., Oct. 24, 1787).
10. Id. at 653-71.
11. Our constitutional structure explicitly guarantees freedom of the press in order to act
as "an additional check on the three official branches." Stewart, "Or of the Press', 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
12. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial
Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 58 (1977).
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function in both criminal and civil trials. 13 Moreover, the history of
the jury suggests this as its main function:' 4 the framers designed the
jury system to provide an important bulwark against the possibility of
government oppression. 15
The Constitution protects the right to a jury trial through the
seventh amendment, which guarantees the right in civil cases. 16
Because the seventh amendment applies only to suits at common law,
however, equitable actions are deemed outside its scope. 17 Accord-
ingly, courts deny a jury trial when the suit is characterized as
equitable.
A tattered remnant of English common law, the law and equity
distinction makes little sense today. It was originally a jurisdictional
distinction, which the merger of the courts of law and equity has now
rendered moot.'8 The scope of the common law has changed radi-
cally over time19 and the once rigid "forms of action" have long since
disappeared. Legislatures have added new causes of action and
expanded the law in unprecedented ways.20
The law and equity distinction is especially troubling in the envi-
ronmental area, where the courts have categorized entire statutes,
such as the Clean Water Act (FWPCA), as equitable.2' The FWPCA
13. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 983-1167 (1971).
14. Id. at 3-16. The struggle to empower the jury and limit the incursions of the Crown
through the judiciary has been exemplified in statutory form through the Magna Carta and
succeeding predecessors to the American Bill of Rights. One of these predecessors was the
English Bill of Rights of 1689. See id. at 3.
15. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Using
the courts to perpetuate government tyranny was a significant cause of the American
revolution. Patriots denounced the English governors' use of vice-admiralty courts for trial of
criminal and civil matters as an illegitimate method of circumventing the right to jury trials.
See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 653-56 & n.47.
16. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right to trial by jury shall be preserved .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
17. The seventh amendment embraces all suits that are not of equity or admiralty
jurisdiction. Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258, 269 (1873).
18. Equity courts had jurisdiction only when there was no recourse in the King's courts.
Because the rigid forms of action precluded litigation of many grievances, the equity courts
developed as an independent, parallel judiciary with their own jurisprudence. C. LOVELL,
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 146-47, 166, 218-23 (1962).
19. "[T]he common law adopts itself by a perpetual process of growth to the perpetual roll
of the tide of circumstances as society advances." W. EARLE, MEMORANDUM ON THE LAW
RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES (1869), quoted in Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendal" A Study
in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 252 n.10 (1975).
20. For example, the Age Discrimination Act created new legal rights and remedies,
enforceable in an action for damages. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982); see Quinn v. Bowmar
Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md. 1978).
21. For example, the Supreme Court held "the scheme [of the FWPCA] as a whole
contemplates the'exercise of discretion and balancing of equities .... " Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 316 (1981) (holding that because the FWPCA permitted the exercise of
19871
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does not include a private right of action; the government prosecutes
all cases. When the government initiates suits, the potential for gov-
ernment abuse increases, and thus the role of the jury becomes even
more critical. Nonetheless, by deeming FWPCA actions to be "equi-
table in nature," the judiciary effectively has denied defendants their
right to a jury trial. Such a characterization of the FWPCA appears
highly arbitrary.
The Supreme Court will confront this issue in United States v.
Tull.22 In Tull, the trial court found, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
that there is no right to a jury trial under the FWPCA.23 This result
is questionable at best. The Fourth Circuit improperly applied tests
that the Supreme Court had previously enunciated for determining
the right to a jury trial. 24 The Supreme Court of the United States,
having granted certiorari,25 will soon review the reasoning and result
of the Fourth Circuit and will have the opportunity to determine con-
clusively whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial in an action by
the United States to recover a statutory penalty under the FWPCA.
This Note disputes the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and conclu-
sion on the jury trial question in Tull and suggests a more appropriate
analytic framework to resolve the question. Part II discusses the fac-
tual background and the Fourth Circuit's "analysis" in Tull. Part III
examines the tests available to the Fourth Circuit in assessing the
right to jury trial for statutory civil penalties actions. It argues that
Tull confirmed a recent and troubling erosion of established principles
that courts used to determine a defendant's right to a jury trial in suits
a court's equitable discretion, the issuance of an injunction was not mandatory). Similarly, a
district court stated "there is no right to a trial by jury in an action brought by the United
States pursuant to the Clean Water Act, even in those cases wherein the government seeks the
imposition of a civil penalty." United States V. Ferro Corp., 627 F. Supp. 508, 510 (M.D. La.
1986).
The courts have also construed the Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982), as
precluding the right to jury trial. "The Court does not agree with [the defendant's]
characterization of the United States suit against it as being legal rather than equitable."
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,897 (D.
Minn. 1983) (holding that the defendant, in a suit the government brought under the
Superfund Act, was not entitled to a jury trial). "The Seventh Amendment does not provide a
right to a jury trial 'if viewed historically the issue would have been tried in the courts of equity
... I Judge Wright's Seventh Amendment analysis of the CERCLA Statutory Scheme
followed the unanimous decisions of other courts faced with the same issue." Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 432 (D. Md. 1986) (citation omitted).
22. 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2244 (1986). For a discussion of
the facts, see infra Section II(A).
23. United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2244 (1986).
24. See infra Section 1II.
25. 106 S. Ct. 2244 (1986).
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asserting a statutory cause of action. Part IV proposes that the
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Tull is poorly reasoned and merely con-
clusory. Further, it argues that the Fourth Circuit inexplicably failed
to apply the Supreme Court's enunciated tests and concludes that if it
had properly applied these tests, the court would have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion. Part V suggests a purposive analysis test for deter-
mining seventh amendment rights when the government initiates
statutory civil penalties actions. Finally, Part VI concludes that the
Supreme Court should reverse the judgment below and use the case as
a vehicle for reaffirming the constitutional role and function of the
jury as an institution established to protect citizens from arbitrary or
oppressive government actions.
II. United States v. Tull
A. Factual Background
In 1976, Edward Tull, an experienced real estate developer,
planned to develop three properties on Chincoteague Island off the
coast of Virginia. To avoid problems with the United States Army
Corps of Engineers (the Corps),26 Tull retained a civil engineer and an
attorney to advise him whether his plan to fill certain ditches on his
property would encroach on "wetlands" or "navigable waters" sub-
ject to the Corps's jurisdiction. They assured him that the ditches
were not protected wetlands because they were located above the
mean high water mark.2 7 Tull requested and obtained an inspection
by Corps officials. He modified his plans to avoid the only two
encroachments that the Corps had identified.
Tull proceeded to develop the sites over the next five years in
accordance with the advice his civil engineer and attorney gave him.
Throughout that period, the Corps maintained surveillance both on
the ground and by aerial observation and photography. At no time
did the Corps advise him that his work had encroached upon "wet-
lands" or other "navigable waters" over which the Corps asserted
jurisdiction. By mid-1981, Tull had substantially completed the three
developments and had sold most of the developed lots to third parties.
At that point, the Corps, on behalf of the United States, filed suit
against Tull. The complaint alleged that Tull had filled "wetlands"
that constituted protected areas within the meaning of section 301(a)
of the Clean Water Act, without first obtaining the statutorily
26. The Corps had twice before sued Tull, apparently claiming that prior developments
had encroached on wetlands and other navigable waters. United States v. Tull, No. 75-319-N
(E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 1975) ; United States v. Tull, No. 73-304 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 1974).
27. Tull, 769 F.2d at 186.
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required permits. The Corps later amended the complaint to add an
allegation that Tull had also filled a shallow channel that had been
navigable within the meaning of the Act. The complaint sought
injunctive relief as well as civil penalties in the amount of $10,000 per
day per violation (a potential liability of $22,890,000). The court
early recognized that injunctive relief was inappropriate with respect
to the property that Tull had sold and the government did not there-
after seek significant injunctive relief.28
Tull argued four defenses. First, Tull claimed that the Corps had
exceeded its powers under the Act by defining navigable waters to
include adjacent wetlands beyond the mean high water mark support-
ing vegetation typically found in saturated areas. Moreover, Tull
claimed that applying such a definition under the statute constituted a
taking without just compensation within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. 29 Additionally, Tull asserted that the government was
equitably estopped by the action and inaction of the Corps before and
28. The Corps sought injunctive relief only for the 6,000 square foot parcel of land still
remaining in Tull's possession. Tull, 615 F. Supp. at 627.
29. Statutory interpretation that has the effect of narrowing constitutional rights requires a
"searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). The judicial restriction of seventh amendment rights by interpreting the FWPCA as
equitable, and thereby precluding jury trials under the Act, is such a constriction. This
equitable categorization gambit deprives such defendants of their civil liberties. Such a
deprivation is particularly crucial where the effect is to deny the defendants full use of their
property (wetlands regulation precludes use of property so defined), to relieve them of their
property (civil fines are levied under the statute), as well as to take away their constitutional
right to jury trial.
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to
travel, is in truth a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a
welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal
right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in
property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1971).
The Sixth Circuit examined the impact of a novel wetlands definition in United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984). There, the court determined that a
narrow interpretation of a regulation that defined the term "wetlands" was necessary in order
"to avoid serious questions concerning the validity of the definition itself under the Act." Id.
at 397. The court pointed out that the statute itself makes no reference to " 'lands' or 'wet-
lands' or flooded areas at all." Id. Furthermore, the court noted a
very real taking problem with the exercise of such apparently unbounded juris-
diction by the Corps, a problem we avoid by construing the regulation containing
the amended wetlands definition as limited to lands such as swamps, marshes,
and bogs that are so frequently flooded by waters from adjacent streams and seas
subject to the jurisdiction of the Corps that it is not unreasonable to classify
them as lands which frequently underlie the "waters of the United States."
Id. at 398.
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throughout the development of the property.3"
Tull's final defense bore directly upon his claim that he was enti-
tled to have a jury determine his liability. Tull claimed that at the
time he filled the ditches, the lands were not wetlands within the
meaning of the FWPCA, even within the expanded definition the
Corps had adopted. In order to find for the government, the trial
court would have had to find as a matter of law that the land in ques-
tion was "wetlands" within the meaning of the Act. Such a conclu-
sion, however, would only be appropriate after the fact finder
specifically determined that the land possessed certain characteristics
that the courts have deemed indicative of wetlands under the statute.
Those characteristics include soil and vegetation types.3" Both sides
presented conflicting testimony concerning the capacity of the
affected lands to support a prevalence of vegetation adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions, and whether that capacity had been
destroyed prior to 1976. Because the experts' testimony so vastly dif-
fered, the district court appointed its own expert to examine the lands,
as well as conducted a viewing of the filled areas.3 2 Tull argued that
he ought to have been allowed to submit this factual and credibility
dispute to a jury, rather than to the court. Finally, Tull claimed that
the equities of the case in any event made the imposition of substantial
civil penalties inappropriate, and that the amount, if any, was also a
matter for the jury to determine.
The district court, however, denied Tull's demand for a jury
trial. The court ruled that the remedies that the Act authorized were
equitable in nature, even the imposition of civil penalties. During the
course of an extensive bench trial, the judge threatened Tull with
severe penalties if he failed to settle and if the judge found Tull had
violated the Act.33 The judge ruled for the government on all legal
and factual issues34 and assessed penalties amounting to $325,000.
The court of appeals affirmed. Tull petitioned the Supreme Court to
30. Tull argued that in filling his ditches, he followed directions that the Corps had given
him, and that "the Corps stood by and watched in silence until the government brought suit in
1981." Tull, 769 F.2d at 187.
31. As noted previously, the statute itself does not define wetlands. See supra note 28
(discussion of wetlands definition). The administrative definition includes areas which are
inundated or saturated with ground water so that the prevalent vegetation is that typical of
swamps, marshes, and bogs. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1984); see also Tull, 769 F.2d at 184.
32. See Tull, 769 F.2d at 185. Counsel for both parties, as well as the court, used experts
to establish the type of soil present at the site, a factual issue that would lay the predicate for
the legal determination of whether the areas in question could be defined as wetlands. 7ull,
615 F. Supp. at 610.
33. Brief for the Petitioner at 13-14, United States v. Tull, 106 S. Ct. 2244 (1986) (No. 85-
1259).
34. The district court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to determine that the
19871
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consider both the jury trial issue and the equitable estoppel issue. The
Court, however, granted certiorari only on the jury trial issue. 3
B. The Reasoning
The Fourth Circuit based its denial of a right to jury trial on
three propositions, all of which are unsound. 36 First, the court noted
that the FWPCA confers equitable power (that is, the statute is not
"at common law") and thus does not fall within the scope of the sev-
enth amendment.37 Second, the court concluded that the penalties
exacted under the FWPCA are not remedies "at law."'38 Third, the
court found that even if civil penalties are generally categorized as
legal remedies, because the Clean Water Act provides a "package" of
legal and equitable remedies, they lose their legal nature.3 9
Although the Tull court acknowledged that the proper test for
applying the seventh amendment is whether the action is "in the
nature of an action existing at common law when the [seventh]
amendment was adopted," 4 it did not analyze the statutory civil pen-
alty actions at issue in Tull under this test. Additionally, the court
rejected Tull's argument that seventh amendment rights inhere to
suits brought by the government for civil penalties finding that the
"Supreme Court has left open the question whether ... the seventh
amendment has no application to government litigation at all."' 41
Thus, the court implied that the seventh amendment may be pre-
cluded in all suits brought by the government.
This is the full extent of the Fourth Circuit's analysis.42 Not only
filled areas were wetlands and that the canal "was navigable in fact" prior to Tull's
development. Tull, 769 F.2d at 185.
35. 106 S. Ct. 2244 (1986).
36. Even divining these points from the court's opinion took extraordinary effort because
the court confused these issues in a manner calculated to defy rationality. Tull, 769 F.2d at
186-87.
37. The court summarily rejected the defendant's argument that the right to jury trial
attached to statutory civil penalties actions, and questioned whether the seventh amendment
applied "to government litigation at all." Id. at 186-87.
38. The civil penalties were found to be "within the court's discretion; the government is
not suing to collect a penalty analogous to a remedy at law, but is asking the district court to
exercise statutorily conferred equitable power in determining the amount of the fine." Id. at
187.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 186.
41. Id. at 187
42. The district judge sitting with the Fourth Circuit vehemently dissented, pointing out
that not only did the circumstances of Tull fit all the elements of equitable estoppel, but the
court in its unreasoned opinion neglected clear precedent on the right to jury trial issue. Id. at
188-94. According to the dissent, the majority misinterpreted the scope of the right to jury
trial under the seventh amendment. "It is the equity judge's discretion whose borders are
[Vol. 41:665
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is its analysis incomplete and conclusory, but its reasoning has further
clouded an already murky area of the law. Moreover, the court's
opinion failed to address the underlying problems inherent in the law
and equity distinction. Perhaps most significantly, the court com-
pounded its errors by its complete failure to correctly apply the law
that the Supreme Court had earlier enunciated.43
III. TESTS TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL UNDER
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court of the United States has created a set of his-
torical tests to determine when the right to jury trial inheres in civil
cases. These tests include the historical analysis to which the Tull
court merely alluded and subsequent variations of the test as the
Court set forth in Beacon Theatres v. Westover," Dairy Queen v.
Wood,4 5 Ross v. Bernhard,46 and Curtis v. Loether.47 Finally, there is
an even more compelling test-the purposive analysis test 48-which
best clarifies the analysis needed to resolve the jury trial issue. This
section examines these tests for the purpose of setting up a framework
of factors to use in testing the validity of the Tull court's opinion.
The courts have consistently applied the historical test, which
Justice Story first established in United States v. Wonson.49 This test
asks whether the rights and remedies being litigated would have been
afforded a jury trial in 1791.50 The difficulty with this analysis, how-
ever, is that the line between law and equity has never been distinct.
Cases characterized as equitable in one locale were often character-
ized as legal in another."' Furthermore, before the merger of law and
equity, it was commonly recognized that the common law was not
limited by the right to a jury trial, and not the reverse as the majority would have it." Id. at
192-94.
43. See infra Section IV.
44. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
45. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
46. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
47. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
48. This test, which Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist created in his dissent in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, has not achieved universal recognition. 439 U.S. 322 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is, nonetheless, the most worthwhile test to resolve this issue
because it examines the purposes of the right to jury trial within specific factual contexts.
49. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
50. See id. at 750.
5 1. See Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 ColuM. L. REV. 43, 101-04 (1980). In fact, one commentator cited the high
degree of variance among the states in granting jury trials in civil cases as one reason the
framers did not establish such a right in the original draft of the Constitution. See B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 473.
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intractable, but responsive to varying conditions.2 Equity, on the
other hand, was available only if there was no adequate remedy at
law.
The question of whether a claim was legal or equitable was origi-
nally jurisdictional; courts of law and courts of equity were separate
until the merger of law and equity in 1938. Because the merger of the
courts of law and equity rendered the jurisdictional issue moot, the
courts now focus solely on the remedy in making the law and equity
distinction. Even assuming federal statutes were not "at common
law," the mixture of remedies under statutes such as the FWPCA
(injunctive and monetary relief), makes such an assessment problem-
atic. 3 The Supreme Court, however, has enunciated standards
modeled after the historical approach of Wonson, that it has employed
in making this distinction.
The Supreme Court's seminal post-merger confrontation with
the jury trial issue came in Beacon Theatres v. Westover.54 Beacon
Theatres involved an antitrust controversy. The owner of a theater,
holding exclusive rights to show "first run" films in a designated area
for a specified period of time, sued for a declaration that such an
arrangement did not violate the antitrust laws. The theater owner
also asked for an injunction pending resolution of the litigation to pre-
vent his competitor from instituting any action against him under the
antitrust laws. The competitor filed an answer, a counterclaim
against the theater owner, and a cross claim against a film distributor
who had intervened. The competitor asked for treble damages and
charged antitrust law violations. The district court rejected the com-
petitor's demand for a jury trial of the factual issues involved because
52. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
53. The statute provides for civil actions as follows:
Civil Actions. The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for
appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any
violation for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under section (a)
of this section. Any action under this subsection may be brought in the district
court of the United States for the district in which the defendant is located or
resides or is doing business, and such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain
such violation and to require compliance. Notice of the commencement of such
action shall be given immediately to the appropriate State.
Civil penalties. Any person who violates sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1328 or 1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any
of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by a State, and
any person who violates any order issued by the Administrator under subsection
(a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day
of such violation.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d) (1982).
54. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
[Vol. 41:665
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it deemed the issues raised "equitable" rather than "legal." The com-
petitor then filed a petition in the Ninth Circuit for a writ of manda-
mus directing the district court to vacate its order. The Ninth Circuit
denied the petition and the plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari. 5
Modifying the Wonson historical test, which looked to the char-
acter of the entire case, the Supreme Court focused on the legal or
equitable nature of each issue.56 The Court found that Beacon Thea-
tres involved both legal and equitable issues. In such a case, the Court
held that a court must afford a jury trial on any legal issues.
Although the Court ostensibly applied an historical test in Bea-
con Theatres, its analysis nevertheless represented a striking departure
from history. It extended the law and equity distinction to statutory
remedies despite the Court's earlier position that all statutory actions
were at law. 8 The effect of the Beacon Theatres decision was to
retain the distinction between jury and nonjury issues despite the sub-
stantial procedural reform that the merger of law and equity had
accomplished. Beacon Theatres does not purport, however, to
demonstrate how to distinguish between legal and equitable issues.
The Court's subsequent use of the historical test in Dairy Queen
v. Wood 59 also failed to identify a fundamental boundary between law
and equity. The Court simply placed a gloss on the historical test by
55. Id. at 501.
56. The opinion describes the purpose of the merger of law and equity under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as being to effect substantial procedural reform while retaining the
distinction between jury and nonjury issues. Thus, it is now necessary to determine whether
the substantive rights being litigated are jury or nonjury issues. Although it would appear that
such a distinction could as plausibly be factual/legal, in practice, courts base their assessment
of the right to jury trial on equitable/legal distinctions. Courts generally accomplish this by
examining whether the remedy sought would be available at law before the merger of law and
equity. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In a different factual
context, the Court made the equitable/legal distinction by determining that, because actions
for recovery of property were traditionally at law, such an action brought under the District of
Columbia Code required a jury trial. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974). The
Court also focused on the nature of the issues involved in defining whether there was a right to
jury trial. See id. at 364. Because the statutory provisions of the FWPCA contain both legal
(monetary relief) and equitable (injunctive relief) issues, under the precedent of Beacon
Theatres and Pernell, courts must afford a jury trial for the legal issues.
57. Although Beacon Theatres explicitly required common issues of fact to be tried first to
a jury, the Court later retreated from that position in Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
In Katchen, the Court held that Beacon Theatres was no more than a general prudential rule
and that a bankruptcy court could try equitable issues prior to the legal claims. The effect of
the Court's decision was to collaterally estop adjudication of factual issues, which would have
been tried to a jury if tried first. However, the Court limited Katchen to administrative
adjudications in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
58. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
59. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
shifting the focus from issues to remedies. Dairy Queen presented an
action for breach of a written trademark licensing agreement. The
plaintiffs sought temporary and permanent injunctions to restrain the
defendant from using the trademark or collecting money from stores
in the territory carrying the trademark. The defendant raised affirma-
tive counterclaims under antitrust and contract law. The trial court
denied the plaintiff's demand for a jury on the alternative bases of the
action being "purely equitable" or the legal issues being "incidental"
to the equitable issues.6" Finding that the claims, in effect, amounted
to a request for a money judgment, the Supreme Court reversed. The
Supreme Court held that when a litigant seeks a money judgment, the
claim is "unquestionably legal."'" The Court stated:
At the outset, we may dispose of one of the grounds upon
which the trial court acted in striking the demand for trial by
jury-that based upon the view that the right to trial by jury may
be lost as to legal issues where those issues are characterized as
"incidental" to equitable issues-for our previous decisions make it
plain that no such rule may be applied in the federal courts.62
Thus, when both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single
case, the court must submit the legal issues to a jury upon a litigant's
assertion of his right.63 The Dairy Queen test requires that a request
for a money judgment, however phrased, automatically entitles a
claimant to a trial by jury.
In Ross v. Bernhard,64 the Supreme Court developed a test that
synthesized the Wonson, Beacon Theatres, and Dairy Queen branches
of the historical analysis. At issue in Ross was the right to a jury trial
in a shareholder derivative suit where the shareholders contended that
the directors of a corporation had converted corporate assets and mis-
managed corporate funds. The Court held that the right to a jury in
derivative actions attaches to those issues that would have entitled the
corporation to a jury if it had sued in its own right.65 The Ross Court
determined that when both equitable and legal claims are before a
court, the right to a jury trial depends on 1) the custom before the
merger of law and equity; 2) the nature of the remedy sought; and
3) the practical abilities and limitations of juries.66
The Supreme Court created the Ross test in an effort to clarify a
60. Id. at 470.
61. See id. at 477.
62. Id. at 470.
63. Id.
64. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
65. Id. at 532-33.
66. Id. at 538 n.1O.
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troubled area of jurisprudence.6 7 The test, however, like its predeces-
sors, provides little guidance. The first and second prongs merely
combine the historical test of Wonson and Beacon with the remedy
inquiry of Dairy Queen. Yet, all of these tests fail to confront the
fundamental question: what is the distinction between law and
equity?6
Furthermore, the third prong of the Ross test, the practical abili-
ties and limitations of juries, also fails to address this question. This
prong provides an exception to the jury trial in cases with complex
accounting problems, traditionally handled by the courts of equity.69
Like the historical analysis, however, the third prong works on the
level of characterization without offering guidelines as to how a court
is to decide what constitutes equity.
Following Ross, the Supreme Court broached the right to jury
trial in the context of statutory rights. Applying the Ross test in Cur-
tis v. Loether,7 ° the Court held that when Congress provides for the
enforcement of statutory rights in ordinary civil actions in the federal
courts, and when there is no functional justification7 ' for denying sev-
enth amendment rights, a jury trial must be available if the action
involves rights and remedies typically enforceable at law.72 Curtis,
however, illustrated the inadequacy of the Ross test as a solution to
the right to jury trial issue by failing to elucidate which rights and
remedies are typically enforceable at law. Furthermore, Curtis posed
new questions regarding the existence of a functional justification for
denying the constitutional right to jury trial. Does presentation of
complex factual issues in a statutory action compel the abridgement
of seventh amendment rights? Curtis suggested it might.7 3 By leaving
that question unanswered, Curtis, while ostensibly clarifying the
issues, managed only to further muddy the waters.
The historical tests of Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross
fail to provide adequate guidance to make the distinction between law
and equity. There is, however, another vision recognized in the case
law which is more compelling. This test circumvents the law and
equity issue by examining the need for a jury in the context of the
67. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 643-44.
68. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
69. See Arnold, supra note 1.
70. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
71. The third prong of the Ross test would preclude a jury trial when the court determines
that a jury would be incapable of making a determination due to the complexity of the issues
involved. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
72. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
73. Id.
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separation of powers. Justice Rehnquist's vigorous dissent in Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 1 4 best illustrates this vision.
In Parklane Hosiery, a stockholder brought a derivative suit
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934"5 demanding mone-
tary relief for an allegedly false and misleading proxy statement. The
defendant requested a jury trial for issues common to the legal and
equitable claims. Before the litigation commenced, the Securities and
Exchange Commission issued an injunction against the defendants for
essentially the same statements at issue in the stockholder derivative
suit. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, contending that
collateral estoppel prevented relitigation of the common factual
issues. The district court denied the motion because it felt such an
offensive use of collateral estoppel would violate the defendants' sev-
enth amendment rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal of the
district court76 and thus precluded the defendants from relitigating
the factual issues of the material falsity and misleading nature of the
proxy statement. The defendants argued that if the Court permitted
factual issues to be tried first in an equitable proceeding (such as the
injunction action the Securities and Exchange Commission brought),
the equitable determination would have collateral estoppel effect in
subsequent legal actions. Such a use of collateral estoppel violates the
defendants' seventh amendment rights because it precludes a jury
determination of the factual issues. The majority quickly dismissed
this argument because "[a]t common law, a litigant was not entitled
to have a jury determine issues that had been previously adjudicated
by a chancellor in equity." 7 Furthermore, procedural changes in the
use of collateral estoppel since 1791 do not affect seventh amendment
rights.78
In a well reasoned dissent, Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist
argued that an historical analysis would have resulted in a jury trial
for the claim that the proxy statement was misleading. Fraud was
historically an action at common law. When the majority proclaimed
the unavailability of the action for a misleading proxy statement
under the Securities Exchange Act at common law, Justice Rehnquist
objected:
[The majority's analysis is] tantamount to saying that since a party
74. 439 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
76. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 337.
77. Id. at 333.
78. Id. at 337.
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would not be entitled to a jury trial if he brought an equitable
action, there is no persuasive reason why he should receive a jury
trial on virtually the same issues if instead he chooses to bring a
lawsuit in the nature of a legal action.7 9
Justice Rehnquist's dissent correctly pointed out that the Parklane
Court failed to assess the nature of the issues involved. Had it done
so, the majority would have of necessity concluded that an action for
fraud was in the nature of a legal action. Instead it categorically
defined the action as equitable.8"
Proposing an alternate vision of the law and equity distinction,
Justice Rehnquist argued that a court should apply the historical
analysis purposively to further the policies underlying the seventh
amendment-prevention of oppression by the government or the
judiciary. A court should not deny such an important constitutional
right, he argued, merely because the judiciary deems a jury trial inap-
propriate.8' Thus, according to Justice Rehnquist's dissent, a correct
historical analysis of the nature of a claim demands not only a deter-
mination of whether there would have been a legal claim in 1791, but
also whether a jury is required to effectuate the purposes of the sev-
enth amendment. 82
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ENUNCIATED TESTS: A FURTHER
LOOK AT Tull
The Tull court completely failed to address the precedents of
Wonson, Beacon Theatres, and their progeny.83 If one applies the
available tests to the three premises of Tull, the inadequacy of its
opinion becomes apparent. The Tull court failed to correctly apply
any of the enunciated tests in reaching its conclusion. The premises
upon which the Tull court based its opinion and its conclusion deny-
ing the right to jury trial are thus open to grave doubt.
79. Id. at 348.
80. See id. at 337.
81. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out:
The Seventh Amendment requires that a party's right to jury trial which existed
at common law be "preserved" from incursions by the government or the
judiciary. Whether this Court believes that use of a jury trial in a particular
instance is necessary, or fair or repetitive is simply irrelevant. If that view is
"rigid," it is the Constitution which commands that rigidity. To hold otherwise
is to rewrite the Seventh Amendment so that a party is guaranteed a jury trial in
civil cases unless this Court thinks a jury trial would be inappropriate.
Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist proposed a purposive historical analysis in light of the
aims of the framers to "keep the administration of law in accord with the wishes and feelings
of the community." Id. at 344.
83. See supra notes 44-72 and accompanying text.
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A. The First Premise: The FWPCA as an Equitable Statute
The court's first premise was that the FWPCA confers only equi-
table power. Under the historical test, this is simply incorrect.
Although statutes may create rights unheard of at common law,84
jurists have historically viewed statutes as expanding the scope of the
law. Early Supreme Court opinions explicitly accorded the right to
jury trial in statutory penalties cases.85 Unless there was an explicit
statutory grant, equity had no jurisdiction to enforce statutory penal-
ties.86 Not only is the FWPCA itself silent in this regard, but the
legislative history does not even suggest that Congress contemplated
precluding jury trials. The FWPCA does, however, mandate litiga-
tion in the federal courts.87 According to case law, Congress's choice
of forum is dispositive of the issue, and requires a jury trial be pro-
vided on demand.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Com-
mission" makes this point. In Atlas Roofing, the agency found that
two employers had violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA).8 9 The employers sought judicial review in the federal courts
asserting that the Act violated their seventh amendment rights by
deeming administrative fact findings conclusive. The Court held that
Congress was not required to commit new statutory causes of action
to the federal courts and determined that congressional assignment of
OSHA adjudication to an administrative agency was dispositive in
precluding the right to jury trial. Under Atlas Roofing, then, an
administrative agency may adjudicate rights which would, if tried in a
federal court, necessitate trial by jury. Where Congress provides for
the enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the
federal courts, however, a jury trial must be available if the action
involves rights and remedies typically enforceable at law.90 While
Congress assuredly may create a new cause of action enforceable by a
juryless administrative agency without violating seventh amendment
84. The reasoning of the majority in Parklane Hosiery could arguably preclude jury trials
for new statutory rights. The Tull court, however, did not address this issue. Furthermore,
the Parkland Hosiery majority opinion is misinformed. See supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text.
85. For example, in Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, the Court explicitly held that "equity
never aids the collection of statutory penalties." 252 U.S. 159, 170 (1920); see also Hepner v.
United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Stevens v. Gladding & Proud, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 64 (1856).
86. Stevens v. Gladding & Proud, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 64 (1856) (holding that equity has no
jurisdiction to enforce statutory penalties without a specific statutory grant).
87. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
88. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
90. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455.
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rights,9 it must do so explicitly. If Congress commits the enforce-
ment of statutes and the imposition of fines to the judiciary, a jury
trial must be available.92
B. The Second Premise: The Equitable Nature of the Remedies
The second Tull assumption, that the civil penalties assessed
under the statutory provisions were not "legal" remedies, is equally
problematic. The statute itself does not address the equitable or legal
nature of the remedies provided. 93 Nevertheless, Congress provided a
system of government permits, injunctive and monetary relief, and
criminal penalties. The statute thus includes both legal and equitable
remedies. Because legal issues (monetary relief) and equitable issues
(injunctive relief) coexist under the FWPCA, Beacon Theatres94 man-
dates a jury trial for the legal issues.95 The Tull court disregarded the
clear command of Beacon Theatres, however, and claimed that the
availability of both legal and equitable relief in the statute precluded
trial by jury. The Tull court reached this conclusion without any
mention of Beacon Theatres, and without advancing any reasons why
that case did not apply to the facts of Tull.
The Tull court also disregarded the enunciated test of Dairy
Queen.96 That test requires that a court afford a jury trial to a claim-
ant seeking a money judgment, however alleged. Yet the Tull court
declared that civil penalties under the FWPCA were not "analogous
to a remedy at law."97 A demand for civil penalties, however, is a
request for a money judgment, and must, therefore, under the force of
Dairy Queen, be afforded a jury trial.
The Tull court similarly disregarded the Ross test and did not
examine its three prongs. It failed to examine the custom of the
courts in dealing with civil penalties before the merger of law and
equity. It failed to examine the nature of the remedy sought, merely
concluding that the remedy was "equitable." The court also failed to
examine the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Although the
91. See id. at 461.
92. Id.
93. The purpose of the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA was to "establish a
comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution." S. REP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1971). The objective of the FWPCA is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waterways." 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)
(1982).
94. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
95. But see supra note 57 (discussing the Katchen analysis of this issue).
96. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
97. United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2244
(1986).
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three prongs of the Ross test have inherent problems,98 the Tull court
should at least have addressed those factors.
Moreover, had the court applied the Ross test, it would necessar-
ily have reached a different conclusion. The custom of the courts
before the merger of law and equity was to grant jurisdiction to equity
only where there was no remedy at common law.99 The nature of the
civil penalties remedy under the FWPCA is monetary relief. Civil
penalties, as monetary relief, were traditionally available at law."
The availability of such legal relief would have precluded equitable
relief. Furthermore, the practical abilities and limitations of juries,
the third prong of the Ross test, would not have prevented a jury trial
in Tull, because the case presented no issues more complex than those
arising in many tort actions for which courts traditionally afford
juries. i0l
Not only did the Tull court completely disregard Beacon Thea-
tres, Dairy Queen, and Ross, but it also ignored the holding of Curtis.
Applying the Ross test, the Supreme Court held in Curtis that when
Congress grants jurisdiction to the federal courts, rather than to
administrative agencies, a court must inquire as to the nature of the
remedy and afford a jury if it determines that the action involves
rights and remedies typically enforceable at law. ' 2 This holding may
have dictated a different outcome in Tull because Congress expressly
provided for federal court jurisdiction over FWPCA litigation. Thus,
the court should have determined the nature of the remedy sought
before rejecting the defendant's request for a jury trial. In fact, the
FWPCA conferred a remedy typically enforceable at law, a money
judgment for civil penalties. This determination is, however, admit-
tedly problematic because the distinction between law and equity has
always been hazy and the Tull court arguably could have offered justi-
fication for either classification. 0 3 The flaw in the court's analysis is
not that it interpreted the Curtis ' holding incorrectly, the flaw is
98. The first two prongs of the Ross test involve a difficult distinction between law and
equity. The third prong, which precludes juries in complex factual situations, is highly
controversial, and may be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 1.
99. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962).
100. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
101. In Tull, the fact finder had to determine whether the composition of the soil and
vegetation indicated that the soil was saturated with ground water or periodically inundated by
tidal waters. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
102. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
103. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 128-30 and
accompanying text.
104. 415 U.S. at 189.
[Vol. 41:665
UNITED STATES v. TULL
that it made no attempt to apply the Curtis test at all.' 05 The Supreme
Court tests explicitly demand an examination of the nature of the
remedial issues involved. The Tull court's conclusory opinion lacked
such an examination.
C. The Third Premise: A "Package" of Remedies Makes Such
Relief Equitable
Not only did the Tull court ignore established tests, but it also
never examined the question of whether a statutory scheme allowing
civil penalties, government permits, and court injunctions authorizes
legal relief. Thus, the court never made the proper inquiry to deter-
mine whether the FWPCA entitles the defendant to demand a jury
trial. The Tull court merely asserted that the monetary relief the gov-
ernment requested was equitable because it was part of "a 'package' of
remedies, one part of the package affecting assessment of the
others."'0 6 The court contended that even if the monetary relief could
be characterized as damages, the defendant would not be afforded a
jury trial because such relief was merely incidental to the injunctive
relief, and "equity courts traditionally granted such monetary
relief.' ' 1o7
This conclusion is in conflict with the express holding of Dairy
Queen. 10 8 Moreover, while monetary relief under the FWPCA may
not constitute traditional legal damages, 10 9 damages are not the only
monetary relief available at law. For example, in United States v. J.B.
Williams Co. , I0 the court considered both civil penalties and forfeit-
ures to be legal remedies. In assessing the availability of jury trial for
Federal Trade Commission violations, the court held that
[t]here can be no doubt that in general "there is a right of jury trial
when the United States sues ... to collect a penalty, even though
the statute is silent on the right of jury trial."
Many cases, arising under a broad range of other civil penalty
and forfeiture provisions, have reached the same conclusion. In
105. Although the Tull court cited Curtis, it did so only in a cursory way, and completely
failed to discuss the test. Tull, 769 F.2d at 187.
106. Id. To clarify the fallacy: In the context of Tull, the damage had been done. Apart
from a mandatory injunction (impossible because the land had already been sold) or restitution
award, equitable relief was not possible. The government elected instead to seek the legal
remedy, civil penalties. United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 612 (E.D. Va. 1983).
107. See Tull, 769 F.2d at 187.
108. 369 U.S. at 479-80.
109. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that
monetary relief in the form of civil penalties is not necessarily characterized as damages but
may be equitable in nature).
110. 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
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The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391, 21 U.S. 391, 5 L.Ed. 644 (1823), the
Court held that when goods were seized on land, a statutory libel
of information entitled the defendant to a jury trial. The Court has
consistently held since then that forfeitures occurring on land are
civil actions at law, entitling the parties to a jury unless it was
waived. Similarly, actions for statutory penalties have been held to
entail a right to jury trial, even though the statute is silent, both
where the amount of the penalty was fixed and where it was subject
to the discretion of the court. 11'
Thus, courts have traditionally found civil penalties to be "at law."
The Clean Water Act contains provisions for injunctive relief,", 2
as well as five separate civil penalty provisions." 3 Under the Court's
analysis in J.B. Williams, this statute offers a mixture of equitable and
legal remedies. Under Beacon Theatres and J. B. Williams, a statutory
scheme that includes traditionally equitable relief (injunctions) does
not preclude jury trial for the legal claims. " 4 Rather, it affirms a liti-
gant's right to try the legal claims before a jury.'' 5
The Tull court, however, did not claim that the case involved
mixed issues of law and equity. It merely asserted that the "govern-
ment is not suing to collect a penalty analogous to a remedy at
law.""I6 In light of early Supreme Court cases, 7 which equated stat-
utory penalties with remedies at law, the court's characterization was
incorrect.I" Equitable remedies are available only if there are no ade-
quate remedies at law. 119 In Dairy Queen, the Supreme Court noted
that removing the inadequacy of a remedy at law by statute decreases
the scope of equitable remedies. 2 ° Under Atlas Roofing, if Congress
creates a new statutory remedy, a court will presume, if the action is
111. See id. at 422-23 (citations and footnotes omitted).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982).
113. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321, 1322, 1344, 1415 (1982).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
115. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); United States v. J.B. Williams Co.,
498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
116. United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2244
(1986).
117. See, e.g., Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159 (1920); United States v. Regan,
232 U.S. 37 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Stevens v. Gladding &
Proud, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 64 (1856).
118. Of course, there is always an exception to the rule that statutory remedies entitle a
claimant to a jury. By explicitly committing adjudication to an administrative agency,
Congress may, in effect, deprive a litigant of his right to demand a jury trial. See supra text
accompanying notes 88-93.
119. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962).
120. Id. at 478 n.19.
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committed to the federal courts, that the remedy is legal in nature. 2 ,
Furthermore, civil penalties smack of punitive damages, which are
always afforded a jury trial. 22 Finally, even if courts historically cate-
gorized civil penalties as equitable, and the evidence indicates that
this was not the case,' 23 there is no longer a reason to do so. The
merger of the courts of law and equity makes the historical categori-
zation meaningless.' 24
V. A NEW VISION: THE FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
The historical test examines whether the rights or remedies at
issue would have been litigated in the courts of law or equity in 1791.
This analysis is problematic because it provides little guidance to
courts in making the determination of what causes of action would
have been at law or equity in 1791, and is therefore indeterminate.
The distinction between law and equity originated in the separate
genesis of the King's courts and the chancery courts in medieval Eng-
land. 125 Because of the highly formalistic nature of the forms of
action at common law, it was necessary to provide a forum for griev-
ances that did not fit neatly within the rigid confines of the forms of
action.126 Because the courts of equity evolved as a safety valve for a
stringent judicial system, availability of a remedy at law precluded
equity jurisdiction. The equity courts developed as an independent,
parallel judiciary within the English judicial system, with their own
jurisprudence; independent of that of the King's Bench, but available
only when there was no cause of action at common law.
12 7
By the late eighteenth century, when the framers ratified the Bill
of Rights, the courts at equity clearly had jurisdiction over certain
categories of claims. These were generally claims requesting that the
defendant "do" something (requests for injunctive relief or specific
performance)' 28 as opposed to those requiring that the defendant
121. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 & n.7 (1977);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974).
122. Wojciak v. Northern Packaging Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 1985); Cieslewicz v.
Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
123. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
125. See F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 123-37 (1908).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. For cases categorizing injunction as an equitable remedy, see Guajardo v. Estelle, 580
F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978); International Word Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 710
(D.S.C. 1984); Donovan v. Home Lighting, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 604 (D. Colo. 1982); see also
Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Furs, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 720 (D. Wis. 1980) (Specific performance is
an equitable remedy.).
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"pay" something. 129 Unfortunately, the distinction between "doing"
and "paying" is in itself confusing and subjective. This confusion
often resulted in courts arbitrarily categorizing similar claims
differently. '30
The case law demonstrates this arbitrary categorization. Courts
characterize claims requesting damages as legal. Damages are mone-
tary relief, but not all monetary relief is necessarily categorized as
damages. Sometimes, in what appear to be similar circumstances, a
court may consider the monetary relief to be in the nature of specific
performance or restitution, and therefore equitable. 131 For example,
courts have deemed back pay awards under Title VIII32 restitutionary
(equitable), 3 3 whereas courts have categorized back pay awards
under the Age Discrimination Act 34 as damages (legal).' 35 The stat-
utory language of the Superfund Act 1 6 provides for both "damages,"
which the courts assess as legal, and "cost recovery," which they cate-
gorize as either legal or equitable. Historically, courts viewed civil
penalties as actions in debt, which were legal in nature. 137 Modem
statutory civil penalties provisions have been categorized as either
legal, ' 38 equitable, 139 or both. 4 0
The jurisdictional merger of the courts of law and equity has
made the distinction between law and equity-originally based solely
on jurisdictional criteria-an anachronism. '' Further, it is a danger-
ous anachronism, threatening the separation of powers structure that
the framers of our Constitution envisioned. Permitting the courts to
make ad hoc, subjective characterizations of claims as either equitable
or legal gives the courts the power to supercede the seventh amend-
129. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1982) (recovery of monetary relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 categorized as damages).
130. Chesnin & Hazard, Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J.
999, 1001-10 (1974).
131. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 115 (1937).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982).
133. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Back pay is an equitable
remedy.).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
135. See Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (right to jury trial pertains to "back
pay" litigation under the Age Discrimination Act); Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370
F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (same).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
137. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
138. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
139. United States v. Ferro Corp., 627 F. Supp. 508 (M.D. La. 1986).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985) (The fact that the
provision for damages and the provision for cost recovery relief appear in separate clauses in
the Superfund Act means that Congress intended to provide both legal and equitable relief.).
141. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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ment right to jury trial. This, in effect, enables the courts to obviate
juries, which exist in part to check the power of the courts themselves.
In Tull, the court, without discussion of Supreme Court prece-
dent, narrowed the availability of the constitutionally provided right
to jury trial. Tull is dangerous inasmuch as other courts may rely on
this unreasoned opinion to further encroach on this constitutional
right. For example, while agreeing that the nature of the issue before
the court determines the availability of the right to jury trial, the
Eleventh Circuit recently cited Tull 142 for the proposition that all
actions under the Clean Water Act are equitable, and thus, triable
solely to the court. 143 The court enunciated this overbroad and
unsound rule without analysis. Moreover, because Congress did not
create administrative agency jurisdiction over the FWPCA, all issues
arising under the statute are presumptively triable to a jury."4 Tull,
however, has become precedent for judicial disregard of constitution-
ally mandated checks and balances, and confirms the recent trend 145
eroding the place of the jury trial in the system of separation of
powers.
The static interpretation of the phrase, "the right to jury trial
shall be preserved," as meaning only the right as it existed in 1791, is
irrational under our present merged system. A saner analysis would
discard the law and equity distinction and directly assess the merits of
the jury trial for a particular claim in light of the purpose of the jury
in our constitutional democracy. 46 That is not to say that courts
should afford all litigants juries on demand. Rather, instead of
attempting to categorically determine what actions would have been
at law or equity in 1791, the courts should extend seventh amendment
rights when seventh amendment interests are at stake.
This is the thrust of the test that Justice Rehnquist outlined in his
dissent in Parklane Hosiery. The court should apply the historical
analysis purposively to prevent oppression by the government or the
judiciary and to implement separation of powers. In Tull, the sover-
eign sued a private citizen under the FWPCA, a legislative act. The
trial judge threatened the defendant with steep penalties if the parties
142. In M.C.C. of Florida, the remedy sought was money damages, not for restitution of
expenses incurred, but for future environmental projects. Nonetheless, the court cited Tull as
precluding the right to trial by jury. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501,
1507 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985).
143. See id. at 1503.
144. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d
414 (2d Cir. 1974).
145. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
147. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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did not settle. This is the paradigmatic situation that most concerned
the framers in setting up the constitutional system. Thus, had the
Tull court applied the functional analysis, it would have had to grant
a jury trial to preserve the integrity of the separation of powers
doctrine.
History clearly demonstrates that the Tull situation fell within
the framers' contemplated concerns. Prior to the signing of the
Magna Carta, civil discontent over oppressive judicial practices, prin-
cipally in the collection of amercements, had threatened to erupt in
civil war. 4 By signing the Magna Carta, King John formally estab-
lished the jury system in medieval England.
A similar conflict over oppressive judicial/executive practices
occurred in the American colonies. Deprivation of the right to jury
trial by assigning cases arising in the colonies to the vice-admiralty
courts was a significant cause of the American Revolution.' 49 The
Declaration of Independence enumerated this grievance as a reason
for the break with England, and the right to jury trials is specifically
guaranteed in the sixth amendment for criminal trials and the seventh
amendment for civil trials. The lack of provisions for civil jury trials
in the Constitution was a significant factor in the demand for a Bill of
Rights in the Constitution. 50
The framers ratified the seventh amendment in the face of severe
disagreements between the federalists and antifederalists.' 5' Whereas
the federalists believed that it was unnecessary to expressly provide
for civil jury trials because the structure of the government itself sug-
gested such a system,'52 the antifederalists insisted that such guaran-
tees must be explicitly enumerated to prevent government
oppression. 153 The arguments the antifederalists advanced for includ-
ing the right to jury trial in the Bill of Rights included "the protection
of debtor defendants; the frustration of unwise legislation; the over-
turning of the practices of courts of vice-admiralty; the vindication of
the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government; and
the protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive
judges."' 54 On this subject, the antifederalists won; the framers
explicitly included the right to civil jury trial in the Bill of Rights as
148. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 3-16.
149. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 653.
150. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 435-623.
151. Id.
152. THE FEDERAIST No. 83, at 60 (A. Hamilton) (G. Wills ed. 1982).
153. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 3-46.
154. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 670-71.
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the seventh amendment.' 55
Suits brought by the sovereign are precisely the kind of adjudica-
tion that most need the jury's moderating influence. Categorizing
cases as outside the scope of the common law presents the same kind
of judicial disregard for civil liberties which, when used by the Eng-
lish governors, precipitated the American Revolution.5 6 The framers
specifically included the right to civil jury trial in the Bill of Rights in
order to prevent this type of government tyranny and to implement
the separation of powers fundamental to our system of government.'
5 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Tull for two reasons. First, the historical analysis does not yield
the Tull court's result. Historically, courts perceived statutes as
expanding the jurisdiction of the common law, not the jurisdiction of
equity courts.'5 I In addition, equity jurisdiction applies only when
there is not an adequate remedy at law.' 59 In Tull, the government
sought civil penalties; penalties are a money judgment and therefore
an adequate remedy at law. 160 Moreover, Congress assigned the initial
adjudication under FWCPA to the federal courts, rather than to an
administrative agency, a result which demands the right to jury trial
in this context.' 61 Finally, preclusion of a jury trial where the reme-
dies the government sought included mixed equitable and legal issues
is plainly wrong. The well-settled law of Beacon Theatres, Dairy
Queen, and Curtis demonstrates the opposite. Tull is, therefore, not
only a poorly reasoned opinion, but reaches an incorrect result.
The Court should also reverse Tull to implement more fully the
separation of powers fundamental to our constitutional scheme. Tull
presents the quintessential situation that the framers contemplated in
ratifying the seventh amendment. 162 Tull involved the protection of a
"debtor" defendant because at the time of the ratification of the Con-
stitution, courts viewed the collection of civil penalties as an action in
debt. ' 3 Further, the government sued under the FWPCA; legislative
155. Id. at 672.
156. Id. at 654.
157. See generally Wolfram, supra note 8.
158. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
159. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471 (1962).
160. No matter how a court construes a complaint, a claim for money damages is legal in
nature. See id. at 477.
161. See supra notes 70-71, 88-92 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
163. See F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 52 (1976).
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actions also concerned the framers because legislation may be passed
that is unwise, and possibly unconstitutional. 64 The judiciary may
not be able, either because it does not wish to or because it does not
view frustration of legislation as its role, to provide the strict scrutiny
the Constitution requires. The jury provides that function when the
judiciary cannot.1 65
The deprivation of the right to jury trial by assigning cases to the
courts of vice-admiralty was one of the prime causes of the American
Revolution. 66  That practice is analogous to current judicial
encroachment upon this right through use of the law and equity dis-
tinction, which the Fourth Circuit exemplified in Tull. The framers'
concern with fairly protecting the interests of private citizens in litiga-
tion against the government also inheres in Tull. The circumstances
of Tull demonstrate an obvious need for protection against overbear-
ing and oppressive judges: the district court judge pressured Tull to
settle before completion of the litigation and threatened him with stiff
penalties if he failed to settle. 167 Because the framers intended the
seventh amendment to protect the people from such judicial/execu-
tive oppression, the jury's role in governance should be implemented
and preserved. The jury's role must be preserved, not in the static
sense of pickling in the historic brine of 1791, but preserved in the
dynamic sense of implemented, cherished, and enabled.
Courts consistently have denied the right to jury trial in the area
of environmental law. 61 Courts routinely categorize cases under the
FWPCA as equitable despite the lack of any indication that Congress
intended such a result. There is no private right of action under the
FWPCA, so only the government may bring suit. This possibility of
the executive abusing its authority in collusion with the judiciary was
164. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 664 & n.69.
165. Where the political processes that would ordinarily correct unwise legislation
adversely affect minority groups, the judicial system must be relied upon to correct it. See
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
166. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 654-56.
167. Brief for the Petitioner at 14, United States v. Tull, 106 S. Ct. 2244 (1986) (No. 85-
1259).
168. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986);
United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.
Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,897 (D. Minn. 1983). There is no provision denying trial by jury in the
FWPCA, nor is there language that might imply equitable jurisdiction. Courts originally
categorized FWPCA cases, as well as cases brought under its predecessor, the Rivers and
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1982), as equitable because the government was attempting to
recoup funds it had expended in cleaning up oil spills or removing sunken vessels. See, e.g.,
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
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precisely the situation which concerned the framers and generated the
seventh amendment.
Courts must carefully scrutinize any curtailment of seventh
amendment rights. Characterization of the FWPCA as entirely equi-
table, despite the presence of monetary remedies, precludes the exer-
cise of constitutional rights in another area of environmental law.
Because courts consistently cite FWPCA cases as precedent in bur-
geoning litigation under the Superfund Act, courts inappropriately
preclude seventh amendment rights under the Superfund Act as
well.169 Routine and superficial analysis, in effect, has removed much
of environmental litigation, often involving important fact sensitivity,
and necessitating implementation of community values, from the pro-
tective scope of the seventh amendment solely on the basis of ground-
less categorization.
The right to trial by jury is an "important bulwark against tyr-
anny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim
of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary."' 7 °
Despite the perceived importance of this right, courts have gradually
eroded it to a mere procedural question, and routinely deny this right
in civil cases. The seventh amendment appears in the Bill of Rights-
the people of this nation have never repealed it. For the judiciary sua
sponte to abridge the scope of this fundamental right represents a
grievous overreaching of judicial power. The framers never saw fit to
grant the judiciary the unilateral power to repeal or otherwise eviscer-
ate the seventh amendment. Such an abuse of power flouts one of the
primary concerns of the framers of the Constitution: 7 ' the mainte-
nance of the separation of powers structure. The right to jury trial
must be preserved in spite of any implicitly perceived expense, ineffi-
ciency, or inadequacy, precisely because it is a fundamental aspect of
American government.
ERICA B. CLEMENTS*
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1261 (1982); see supra note 21.
170. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171. See Wolfram, supra note 8.
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